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This study analyses the effect of political stability and macroeconomic uncertainty on 
aggregate investment behaviour in Pakistan over the period 1960–2015. The Auto-Regressive 
Distributed Lags (ARDL) methodology is applied to explore both the long-run equilibrium 
relationship and short-run behaviour of investment. The macroeconomic uncertainty variable is 
derived from real exchange rate and is computed by the best-fitted GARCH model. The results 
reveal robust effects of political stability and macroeconomic uncertainty on overall 
investment activity in Pakistan. The government nationalisation policy, GDP growth, user cost 
of capital, credit availability and degree of openness are found to be the other key determining 
factors for investment both in long- and short-run. However, the favourable impact of physical 
infrastructure on investment holds in long-run only, while its effect is adverse though 
insignificantly in short-run. The findings support the neoclassical flexible accelerator principle 
and are consistent with economic theory. The volume of available funds is the binding 
constraint for investment and the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis is validated in the short-run. 
Keywords: Aggregate Investment, Irreversibility, Macroeconomic Uncertainty, 
Political Stability, GARCH, ARDL, Bound Testing Approach, 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The existing theoretical and empirical literature suggest that investment is 
influenced by three categories of factors, which are anticipated future demand, past 
decisions and current market opportunities [Lucas and Prescott (1971)]. In the 
perspective of anticipated future demand, Jorgenson (1971, p. 1142) claimed that 
consideration of uncertainty in modelling and empirical analysis is the most important 
challenge. Uncertainty is classified into macroeconomic uncertainty, which could be the 
outcome of fluctuations in macro variables like GDP, CPI, exchange rate, etc. and 
political instability like civil conflicts, bad governance; unstable governments, etc. [see 
Knight (1921); Feng (2001); Le (2004)].  
It is generally presumed that uncertainty (both macroeconomic and political) may 
have adverse effects on investment. Abdelkader (2017) postulates that investors are 
averse towards investing in a country characterised by economic uncertainty and political 
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instability. The phenomenon of uncertainty is even more pronounced in developing 
countries like Pakistan due to the vulnerable economic conditions and political upheavals. 
The effect of political instability may be more visible because most investment decisions 
in a country like Pakistan are not taken on economic grounds but on an opportunistic and 
public choice basis [Haque (2007)]. 
Investment is irreversible in nature and thus involves an inherent delaying factor 
[Dixit and Pindyck (1994)]. Once capital is installed, it has little or no value unless used 
for the intended production and this makes investment sensitive to risk or uncertainty 
[Pindyck (1993)].  Irreversibility coupled with uncertainty makes potential investors 
reluctant to invest, which results in sub-optimal levels of investment. Hence, irreversible 
investment (that generates sunk cost) and delaying (wait and see) policy are linked with 
uncertainty, which consequently leads to inefficiency because of high cost of doing 
business. Furthermore, investors delay their investment decisions in the wake of unstable 
political environment and prefer to wait for improved and stable political conditions.   
At the micro level, firms’ investment decisions can be delayed in the presence of 
sunk costs, political instability and uncertainty about future cash-flows and unprofitable 
business opportunities. However, at macro level, ‘raised business costs’ are the channel 
of uncertainty. The issue of investment-uncertainty nexus is, therefore, a realistic 
phenomenon in modelling investment behaviour at macro level too, especially in the 
context of developing economies. Macroeconomic uncertainty matters a lot in investment 
decisions because if economic conditions are uncertain, potential investors do not have 
expectations of growth in demand and, hence tend to shy away from taking the risk of 
incurring huge sunk costs in case demand does not grow. Similarly, political 
instability/uncertainty also imposes unexpected costs on investment because it creates the 
risk of unexpected changes in economic policies, especially the structure of taxation and 
other fiscal and monetary policy measures that can directly or indirectly affect cost-
benefit aspects of investment decisions. 
The current body of evidence suggests various measures of uncertainty and 
irreversibility depending upon the data type, nature of the analysis (such as aggregated 
vs. disaggregated and macro vs. micro analysis etc.) and size of the economy. 
Macroeconomic uncertainty has been measured using inflation, real exchange rate and 
interest rate proxies, which have an adverse effect on capital formation [see Aryeetey 
(1994); Pattillo (1998)]. Moreover, different measures have been employed for 
quantifying uncertainty, such as unconditional variance, standard deviation, standard 
deviation of residuals of AR process and conditional volatility generated through an 
estimated GARCH model. In some cases, the percentage rate of change in inflation has 
also been used as a measure of uncertainty.
1
 Unconditional variance or standard deviation 
may be used as a proxy for risk but not for uncertainty. Notably GARCH process seems 
more relevant and it is considered to be relatively more reliable proxy for uncertainty [see 
Darrat and Hakim (2000); Arize, et al. (2000)]. 
Investment activity in Pakistan has gone through various phases over the past sixty 
years as the country has a long history of macroeconomic and political uncertainty. 
Economic uncertainty has been partially caused by global factors like oil price shocks 
(during 1970s and 1990s) and commodity price shocks (2007-09). Another source of 
 
1See Ahmad, et al. (2008); Ahmad and Qayyum  (2008,  2009). 
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economic instability has been internal factors like debt crisis of 1990s, when rupee 
continued to lose its value against US dollar, and major variations in monetary and fiscal 
policy stances and structural reforms under the IMF adjustment programmes. Pakistan 
also faced spells of political instability. For example, four democratically elected 
governments between 1988-99 were dislodged prematurely, on one pretext or the other. 
During this period investment activity mostly remained sluggish. In the context of this 
background it is important to explore to what extent economic and political uncertainties 
have hampered investment activity in Pakistan, while accounting for other 
(conventionally considered) determinants of investment behaviour.  
A few studies have probed the aggregate investment and uncertainty nexus by 
making use of different measures of uncertainty. However, to our knowledge, no study 
has captured the effect of uncertainty (measured through conditional variance, i.e., 
GARCH) coupled with political instability on aggregate gross fixed investment for the 
Pakistan economy. The present study attempts to fill this gap by analysing the effect of 
macroeconomic uncertainty and political stability and investment in Pakistan over the 
period 1960–2015. The study uses a GARCH model to calculate macroeconomic 
uncertainty variable through real exchange rate, while polity score is used as a proxy for 
political instability. ARDL technique is employed to estimate the investment behaviour 
under uncertainty. Figure 1 (a and b) shows that investment growth and the proposed 
measure of macroeconomic uncertainty tend to move over time more-or-less in opposite 
directions indicating negative relationship of investment with macroeconomic 
uncertainty. On the other hand, the relationship between investment growth and political 
stability (opposite of uncertainty) is positive but weak.  
The paper is comprised of six sections. Section 2 presents a review of literature, 
while theoretical background of the model is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 outlines 
the data used, construction of variables, research methodologies and models. Moreover, 
estimates of the parameters are discussed in this section.  The main results and finding of 
the empirical analysis are presented in Section 5. The final section gives concluding 
remarks and outlines the policy implications of this analysis. 
 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The recent strand of literature on investment behaviour mainly focuses on the 
issues of risk, irreversibility and uncertainty. The issue of irreversibility of investment 
and role of risk/uncertainty in determination of investment has gained attention in the 
literature from the late 1980s [for example, see Bernanke (1983); McDonald and Siegel 
(1986); Bertola and Caballero (1994); Belanová (2014)]. The classical theory of real 
options postulates that uncertainty dampens investment activity [Antoshin (2006)]. The 
literature, in general, demonstrates negative impact of irreversibility and uncertainty on 
investment [Lee and Shin (2000); Carruth, et al. (2000)]. It is pertinent to note that 
evidence about the impact of uncertainty has been found positive as well and so 
investment-uncertainty relationship is inconclusive in terms of its impact and intensity 
[Abel, et al. (1996); Patnaik (2016); Lee (2016)].  
The micro or firm-level studies mostly analyse issues of irreversibility, option 
value and delays in investment decisions. In the context of irreversibility, Majd and 
Pindyck (1987) demonstrate that uncertainly may possibly increase the required return to 
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a great extent due to considerable delays in delivery and installation of new capital. The 
literature on the issue has examined the implications of irreversibility for investment-
uncertainty relationship [see Caballero and Pindyck (1992); Pindyck and Solimano 
(1993)]. It is argued that the threshold level of required profit increases along-with 
uncertainty; hence less is invested at higher levels of uncertainty. 
In their pioneering work on investment in an uncertain world, Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) explain how option pricing theory can be utilised to gain insights into the 
irreversible investment behaviour facing demand and price uncertainty. The study 
indicates that investors use the ‘wait and see’ policy prior to undertaking investment in 
the presence of uncertainty. This implies that a higher level of uncertainty leads to lower 
levels of investment. Using panel data of 772 US manufacturing firms Leahy and Whited 
(1996) examine the linkages between investment and uncertainty during the period 1981–
1987 and find that uncertainty negatively causes investment. However, Parker (2010) 
points out that even in micro-level surveys of investment, the impacts of irreversibility 
are hard to observe. The study further elaborates that it can be implied from testable 
effect of irreversibility that the increase in uncertainty affects investment negatively 
through raised option cost of investment. 
In a recent analysis of business investment, Belanová (2014) explore the impacts 
of uncertainty and irreversibility as determining factors of investment. The study finds 
that interaction between these variables may create opportunity costs and application of 
corresponding (real) option and the prevalent conditions pertaining to market structure 
and institutional setup in volatile economies of developing countries are more prone to 
the issue of uncertainty. The study concludes that the inverse relationship between 
uncertainty and investment persists in the presence of irreversibility. According to 
Pindyck and Solimano (1993), uncertainty has robust negative influence on investment in 
the case of developing economies, but for the OECD countries the negative impact is not 
considerable. However, Ferderer (1993) finds that uncertainty negatively influences 
aggregate investment activity in the USA. Levine and Renelt (1992) reveal that even 
though inflation itself and its uncertainty do not have significant effect on investment, yet 
when linked with political uncertainty it may affect investment adversely.   
Employing data of 14 African countries over the time span of 1980–1995, Bleaney 
and Greenway (2001) find that investment is significantly affected by exchange rate 
uncertainty, but not by terms of trade uncertainty. In a more comprehensive study based 
on data for 46 developing countries, Aizenman and Marion (1993) explore the effect of 
uncertainty on investment using a composite uncertainty index derived from the nominal 
money growth, ratio of government expenditures to GDP, and real effective exchange 
rate. The findings show a strong negative effect of volatility on private investment, a 
positive effect on public investment and no significant impact when private and public 
investments are analysed jointly. Similarly, Rozeei, et al. (2014) in the case of Iran finds 
that macroeconomic uncertainty affects the private investment negatively both in the 
short-run and the long-run; when macroeconomic uncertainty is proxied by inflation rate, 
nominal interest rate and real exchange rate. 
Sioum (2002) identifies terms of trade volatility as the only macroeconomic 
uncertainty proxy out of four other measures that negatively and significantly influences 
private investment. However, Serven (1998) and Clausen (2008) find significant direct 
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relationship of investment with volatility of exchange rate. Aysan, et al. (2006) while 
analysing the traditional reasons of low investment for a panel of 39 countries of Middle 
East and North Africa region along-with economic uncertainty using several measures of 
volatility, conclude that deficient economic environment and the lack of economic 
reforms significantly erode private entrepreneurs’ decision to invest. 
The uncertainty measures used in both micro and macro level studies include 
variance, standard deviation and coefficient of variation of key variables in investment 
decision making. GARCH conditional variance, residuals of AR processes and future 
perception measures of variables of interest are often used as proxies of uncertainty 
[Pindyck (1986); Episcopos (1995); Price (1996); Ghosal and Loungani (1996); Pattillo 
(1998); Guiso and Parigi (1999); Bloom, et al. (2007); Belanová (2014)]. The variation in 
results across different studies are mostly due to use of the different measures and 
estimation techniques. Keeping in mind the Knightian and Keynesian viewpoints, risk is 
distinguished from uncertainty on the basis of unconditional or objective method versus 
conditional variances or subjective approach. In this context simple variance/standard 
deviation and residuals of AR processes (unconditional volatility) may be closely related 
measure of the risk whereas the GARCH based conditional volatility can be the relevant 
measure of uncertainty. 
Coupled with (macro) economic uncertainty, volatile and unstable social and 
political situations may also hamper investment flows. In macroeconomic context Rodrik 
(1991) and Pindyck and Solimano (1993) show that political uncertainty tends to reduce 
the level of investment. The factors like weak institutions, fragile political structure, 
disobedience of rule of law, poor law and order conditions, corruption, riots, strikes, 
crime and frequent changes in political regimes are expected to affect the investment 
decisions [see Stewart and Venieris (1985); Sjaastad and Bromley (1997)]. Basically, 
socio-political uncertainty adversely affects investment due to a gloomy investment 
climate. It shatters business confidence and raises cost of doing business because 
property rights cannot be properly enforced. In particular, corruption results in 
inefficiencies, transaction costs and levy of new taxes, which all reduce investment 
activity in the economy [Mauro (1995); Murshed (2002)]. 
Using data of 60 countries, Brunetti and Weder (1997) study the effects of various 
measures of institutional uncertainty on investment over the period 1974–89. The study 
finds that different uncertainty measures are inversely related to investment and 
investment irreversibility magnifies the impact of uncertainty on investment decisions. In 
another major study using data of 48 countries, for the period 1980–2005, Julio and Yook 
(2012) analyse the influence of political uncertainty on corporate investment. The study 
finds that investment is reduced by 4.8 percent on average during election years when 
compared to nonelection years. 
The existing empirical evidence supports the notion that political 
instability/uncertainty can adversely affect the aggregate investment level. The studies 
like Barro (1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) find correlation between cross-country 
differences in rates of investment and measures of violence and political instability. 
Moreover, the literature shows that aggregate investment expenditures are inversely 
related to political uncertainty as well as corruption and bribery [Pindyck and Solimano 
(1993); Mauro (1995)]. 
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3.  THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Investment behaviour is inherently uncertain and should be modelled accordingly. 
Along-with conventional determining factors of investment like profitability, monetary and 
fiscal policy measures, etc., investment analysis incorporates the phenomena of animal 
spirits,
2
 (business) expectations, timing of investment decisions and risk/uncertainty 
[Chirinko (1993); Temple, et al. (2001); Le (2004); Aysan, et al. (2006)]. The effects of 
uncertainty can be viewed in terms of uncertainties about future profitability and discount 
factors; lumpy and irreversible investment; linked and fixed adjustment costs; political 
instability; property rights problem, corruption, rent-seeking and opportunistic behaviour 
[Caballero (1999); Romer (2001); Le (2004)]. Caballero (1999) states the concept of 
‘reluctance to invest’, which states that capital’s marginal profitability should considerably 
outweigh its cost for the investment to take place. Reluctance reflects the value of ‘option to 
wait’. In this case positive simple net present value (NPV) will not be the exclusive 
criterion to invest because of the pending decision for tomorrow and uncertain future. 
Therefore, in the context of value-maximising, simple NPV rule is not optimal in the 
presence of irreversibility and uncertainty [Ingersoll and Ross (1992)].  
The present study uses the model of Le (2004) to construct an econometric model 
of aggregate investment behaviour for Pakistan under macroeconomic uncertainty and 
political instability. The model assumes a large number of economic agents with infinite 
life spans. They consume an amount     from the return on income allocated to 
investment in one period. For simplicity, investors are assumed to allocate their resources 
in a single (domestic) market. Additionally, there is no labour income. A single 
homogeneous good in the country is assumed. Finally, population is assumed to be 
constant and normalised to unity. Assuming that the representative agent maximises 
lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint, Le (2004) concludes that in spirit the 
investment decision under irreversibility and uncertainty are based on expected return 
and risk or uncertainty measured by (conditional or unconditional) variance of returns.  
In the generalised aggregate model, aggregate investment is taken as dependent 
variable and expected return and measures of uncertainty (both political and economic) 
are the explanatory variables. Other control variables could also be included to 
effectively investigate the investment behaviour. In the presence of control variables the 
econometric model assumes the following form: 
I =  + Z + X +   … … … … … … (1) 
where I is the aggregate fixed investment,
3
 X is Vector of macroeconomic uncertainty and 
political instability and Vector Z includes the variables suggested by theoretical and 
empirical studies such as GDP growth (accelerator theory/principle),
4
 user cost of capital 
(neoclassical investment model of Jorgenson), financial development (credit availability), 
 
2 The Keynesian notion of ‘animal spirit’ describes the state of inability of economic agents to perceive 
the future outcomes who are unable to attach probabilities to the possible outcomes. 
3 Many studies have used the real (private/total or aggregate/domestic) investment level rather than its 
ratio to output (GDP) or capital stock [for example, see Serven (1998);  Bleaney and Greenway (2001); Badawi 
(2003); Ajide and Lawanson (2012);  Hamuda,  et al. (2013);  Rozeei, et al. (2014); Akanbi (2016)]. However, 
Le (2004) has taken this variable as private investment to output ratio. 
4 Sakr (1993) and Suhendra and Anwar (2014) have also used GDP growth (as a proxy) to empirically 
test the accelerator theory/model. 
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physical infrastructure and trade openness [for details, see Aysan, et al. (2006)]. Notably 
the literature suggests that investors’ expectations about economic environment can be 
captured through one-year lagged GDP growth rate [Aysan, et al. (2006)].  
Variation in the investment spending with changes in output can be referred to as 
the ‘accelerator principle’ and it indicates changes in demand [Naa-Idar, et al. (2012)]. 
The neoclassical model also suggests that increase in cost of capital/doing business 
makes some of the investment projects economically unfeasible and as a result overall 
investment expenditure declines [Hall and Jorgenson (1969); Akkina and Celebi (2002)]. 
The neoliberal framework of investment behaviour emphasises on the importance of 
financial deepening in encouraging investment [McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973)]. 
Contrary to neoclassical theory of investment, McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis suggests 
a positive impact of real rate of interest on the level of investment as higher interest rates 
can lead to an increase in savings and thus domestic credit available as investible funds. 
Similarly, financial development (bank credit) is also considered as the key determinant 
of investment. In developing countries due to underdeveloped financial markets, interest 
rate does not reflect the true cost of capital and the availability of financial resources 
rather than cost is a binding constraint. Availability of financial resources is captured by 
credit availability [Akkina and Celebi (2002)]. 
Trade openness means access to the latest technology [Hamuda, et al. (2013)]. 
Trade liberalisation reduces trade barriers and thus stimulates the export sector, resulting 
in improvement in the current account balance and increased investment incentives 
[Balassa (1988); Asante (2000); Naa-Idar, et al. (2012)]. Infrastructural development 
increases productivity of capital [Looney (1997)]; reduces the external (transaction) costs 
and hence boosts the rate of return [Asiedu (2002)]; and enlarges the market [Badawi 
(2003); Suhendra and Anwar (2014)]. 
The econometric model in its simple form to represent the relationship between 
investment and its determinants is given by: 
I = 0 + 1 G = 2 UC + 3 FD + 4 OP + 5 PI + 6 GSD 
    + 7 POL + 8 ND +  … … … … … … (2) 
where I, G, UC, FD, OP, PI, GSD, POL, ND denote aggregate fixed investment, real 
GDP growth rate, user cost of capital, financial development, trade openness, physical 
infrastructure, GARCH conditional standard deviation of real exchange rate, polity score 
and nationalisation dummy respectively. 
 
4. DATA AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1.  Data Description 
The study analysis encompasses the time period 1960–2015. All the variables are 
extracted from Pakistan Economic Survey (PES), International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
World Development Indicators (WDI) online version, Polity IV dataset and Penn World 
Table. Real gross fixed capital formation i.e. aggregate fixed investment (I) is the dependent 
variable while real GDP growth (G), user cost of capital (UC), financial development (proxied 
by real domestic credit availability) (FD), trade openness (OP) and physical infrastructure (PI) 
are the major explanatory variables employed in the study. GARCH standard deviation of real 
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exchange rate
5
 represents macroeconomic uncertainty (GSD).
6
 Political stability (POL) is 
proxied by polity IV score. The lower value represents political instability and vice versa. To 
calculate polity score autocracy score is subtracted from the democracy score; with the 
resulting unified polity scale ranging from –10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly 
democratic). To capture the effect of nationalisation, dummy variable (DN) is used. The value 
of it is set equal to one for the years 1972-1974 and zero otherwise.   
 
4.2.  Construction of Variables 
Data on all variables used in the analysis are expressed at constant 1999-2000 
million Pakistan Rupees except user cost of capital, physical infrastructure and polity IV 
score. Monthly real exchange rate data are used to estimate GARCH standard deviations 
series. It is then converted into annual series by taking twelve month average for each 
year. Financial development variable (FD) is proxied by using total domestic credit 
availability. Physical infrastructure (PI) variable is proxied by road density (length of 
roads per square kilometer or area). Trade openness (OP) is computed by dividing the 
sum of exports and imports by GDP.  
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) argue that decision of investment relies upon cost and benefit 
analysis. Benefit side largely depends upon demand, while cost relies on (change in) price of 
capital (the implicit investment deflator)/inflation rate,
7
 (nominal) interest rate and depreciation 
rate. According to Jorgenson, user cost (UC) of capital is represented by the following formula. 
UC = Pk (    
   
  
)  … … … … … … (3) 
where the capital price Pk is approximated by (implicit) investment price deflator, i is 
average of three different nominal interest rates (call money rate, government bond yield 
and discount rate), δ is the depreciation rate,8 and last term      ⁄  shows the growth rate 
of capital price/inflation rate.
9
 
 
4.3.  Estimation Technique 
Majority of macroeconomic time series variables, i.e., GDP, credit availability and 
road density are non-stationary; while some series may be stationary.
10
 The standard 
 
5Real effective exchange rate (REER), in most cases, is a better indicator of actual competitive 
exchange rate. However, for developing countries this indicator has not been much of a help. In Pakistan’s case 
during the fixed exchange rate regime the data on exchange rate was flat before 1982 with a few steps 
representing planned devaluation, rendering itself non-viable for econometric usage. 
6The movements in real exchange rate occur due to inflation, government policies, country 
competitiveness and real variables of the economy. So, it captures the uncertainty originating from inflation 
uncertainty, and all other sorts of uncertainty [see Dornbusch (1976); Van Foreest and De Vries (2003)]. 
7See Akkina and Celebi (2002). 
8The series is taken from Penn World Table. 
9Capital has three costs to the firm namely forgone interest      , depreciation capital cost (    , and 
change in the price of capital over time (   ). Note that probable change in the price of capital     causes the 
increase in cost of using the capital due to the fall in price and vice versa. So, the corresponding cost is     . 
The forgone interest and negative growth in the price of capital (inflation) i.e. real interest rate   (  
   
  
)  
     is opportunity cost (of capital). 
10 Note that if all the variables in the analysis are non-stationary/integrated of order one (or same order) 
and their linear combination is stationary/error-correction i.e. co-integrated (existence of long-run relationship) 
then the r Engle and Granger (1987) or Johansen-Juselius (JJ) (1990) approach method can be applied. In case 
of small data and differing or mix order of integration, the ARDL technique of co-integration is used.  
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estimation techniques like OLS can, therefore, possible produce spurious results.
11
 
Furthermore, endogeneity is another important issue present in many macroeconomic 
relationships, such as output and investment behaviour because of interdependence and 
inertia factor. In such a scenario, the OLS would yield biased and inconsistent estimates. 
The present study addresses these issues by employing the Auto-Regressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) approach outlined by Pesaran, et al. (2001). The advantage of ARDL 
approach is that it not only takes into account the endogeneity issue [Alam and Quazi 
(2003); Rehman, et al. (2009)], but it also does not require all variables to be stationary in 
first differences, allowing some of them to be stationary at level as well.  
Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that in an ARDL model free of residual correlation, 
endogeneity is less of an issue and, therefore, choice of appropriate lags in the ARDL 
model is vital to ensure absence of residual correlation and tackling of endogeneity. 
Another advantage of ARDL method is that it estimates both the long-run and short-run 
responses in the variable under consideration, thereby addressing issues related with 
omitted variables and autocorrelation. Therefore, estimates provided by ARDL method 
are unbiased and efficient because of avoiding the problems caused by endogeneity and 
autocorrelation [Siddiki (2000)]. 
The main disadvantage of ARDL model is that it only allows for one-way 
relationship from all the regressors towards the focused variable (investment in our case). 
Given that investment is, by definition, a part of GDP, one wonders how GDP could be 
considered as exogenous in the system. However, we can justify the use of ARDL 
framework, keeping in view its advantages, on two grounds. First, the GDP variable is 
not represented in level form, rather in the form of year to year growth rate. Therefore, 
even though GDP itself cannot be treated as an exogenous variable, its growth rate could 
still be exogenous with respect to current investment expenditure. Second, preliminary 
data analysis (Granger causality tests) shows that causality from investment to GDP 
growth rate is rather weak, insignificant even at 20 percent level of significance, whereas 
causality from GDP growth rate to investment is statistically significant. 
Using the standard ARDL framework, Equation (2) is generalised as follows. 
       ∑    
  
        ∑    
  
        ∑         
  
    ∑    
  
         
  ∑         
  
    ∑    
  
         ∑          
  
    ∑    
  
          
                                                
                                  … … … (4) 
The null hypothesis of joint restriction that all the parameters βis are equal to zero 
means non-existence of co-integrating relationship among the variables considered. This 
hypothesis is tested using F-statistic, wherein rejection of the null hypothesis would indicate 
existence of a co-integrating (long-run) relationship. The parameters a’s, b’s, c’s, d’s, e’s, f’s, 
g’s and h’s describe the short-run dynamics of the variables. Finally,     the residual term and 
it is assumed as white noise process. The estimates are subject to many econometric issues if 
the assumptions regarding the residual are violated. The diagnostic tests, therefore, consist of 
checking for autocorrelation, normality and heteroscedasticity of errors, Ramsey Reset test 
and the tests for stability of parameters based on CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test. 
 
11Granger and Newbold (1974) have suggested the rule of thumb that estimated results are spurious 
when the coefficient of determination (R2) is larger than the Durbin Watson (DW) statistic of autocorrelation. 
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Multiple lag selection criteria such as Hannan Quinn Criterion (HQC), Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), and adjusted R-square 
are used in ARDL approach. However, the present study mainly focuses on Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC) as it selects the most parsimonious model [Quinn (1988); 
Morimune and Mantani (1995); Pesaran and Shin (1999)]. 
The ARCH and the GARCH models formulated by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev 
(1986), respectively are used to study volatility clustering and model uncertainty 
accordingly. Generally the GARCH model is specified in terms of two equations namely 
the conditional mean equation (ARMA), and conditional variance equation.  For 
diagnostics of lag structure of both the mean and variance equations besides the study of 
autocorrelation structure of residuals and squared residuals, performance criteria like 
AIC, SBC, etc. are also employed.  
It is important to note that besides ARDL and GARCH, to analyse the investment 
behaviour under uncertainty over time, Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) and/or 
Copula models and Extreme Value Theory (EVT) methodology are also used in the 
studies to observe co-movement between uncertainty and investment behaviour [for 
details, see Nguyen and Bhatti (2012); Bhatti and Nguyen (2012); Al Rahahleh, et al. 
(2017)]. But Copula approach to study co-movement between uncertainty and investment 
(dependence between two random variables) does not seem to be feasible for the present 
study. The approach is usually applied to high frequency data [see Palaro and Hotta 
(2006); Righi and Ceretta (2012); Bob (2013); Al Rahahleh and Bhatti (2017)]. Various 
studies have also noted that the approach is hard/cumbersome and tricky and requires 
large samples [Palaro and Hotta (2006); Alexander (2008); Bob (2013)]. For example, 
Alexander (2008) and Bob (2013) suggest that historic sample should be sufficiently 
large to yield enough observations in the tail of the data distribution. 
 
5.  ESTIMATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Firstly, macroeconomic uncertainty is measured by real exchange rate volatility 
through GARCH model. Appendix shows that according to unit root tests results the log 
of real exchange rate series is integrated of order one. Therefore GARCH model is 
considered with first difference of the log of real exchange rate (growth rate of real 
exchange rate). Before fitting the GARCH process, we have tested the presence of ARCH 
process (volatility clusters) using Lagrange Multiplier (LM) ARCH test [Engle (1982)] 
and serial correlation in using Ljung-Box Q-Stat. The results presented in Appendix 
confirm the presence of significant ARCH effects and serial correlation in data. For final 
model selection alternative specifications of GARCH model are run and the results are 
presented in Table 1. Based on the results of these specifications, GARCH (1,3) 
specification for variance equation along-with ARMA (2,3) specification for mean 
equation are considered to be appropriate using AIC, SBC and significant coefficient 
technique. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of the selected GARCH process is verified by 
testing the residual term, which should follow the white noise process. If the residual 
term shows the properties of white noise then the selected model is appropriate. To test 
the residuals, two tests are applied i.e. LM ARCH test and serial correlation using Ljung-
Box Q-Stat. The results presented in Appendix reveal that there is no ARCH and serial 
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correlation left in the residual at 5 percent level of significance, so residuals are white 
noise. After passing the diagnostic test the conditional variances are estimated and using 
12 period averages they are converted into annual time series to be used in our main 
model as a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty. 
 
Table 1 
 Estimates of Alternative GARCH Model 
 ARMA(2,3) ARMA(2,2) 
 GARCH 
(1,1) 
GARCH 
(1,2) 
GARCH 
(1,3) 
GARCH 
(2,3) 
GARCH  
(1,1) 
GARCH 
(1,2) 
GARCH 
(1,3) 
ARCH(1) 0.001 
(0.17) 
0.002*** 
(0.06) 
0.001* 
(0.00) 
0.02** 
(0.04) 
0.006 
(0.15) 
0.003** 
(0.03) 
0.01** 
(0.03) 
ARCH(2)    –0.01  
(0.53) 
   
GARCH(1) 0.968* 
(0.00) 
0.001  
(0.98) 
–0.80*  
(0.00) 
0.41  
(0.68) 
0.89*  
(0.00) 
0.004 
(0.93) 
–0.31* 
(0.00) 
GARCH(2)  0.93*  
(0.00) 
–0.39*  
(0.00) 
0.02  
(0.97) 
 0.925* 
(0.00) 
0.31* 
(0.00) 
GARCH(3)   0.47*  
(0.00) 
0.01  
(0.98) 
  0.88* 
(0.00) 
AIC –4.536 –4.540 –4.798 –4.503 –4.530 –4.537 –4.55 
SBC –4.483 –4.480 –4.732 –4.430 –4.484 –4.484 –4.494 
Adj R2 0.178 0.174 0.168 0.013 0.163 0.168 0.14 
P-values are provided in the brackets.  
The coefficients significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Before presenting the results of ARDL model, it will be informative to observe the 
descriptive relationship of investment growth with the two uncertainty variables. Figure 1 
shows that investment growth forms negative relationship with macroeconomic 
uncertainty and positive relationship with political stability (opposite to political 
instability or uncertainty). 
 
Fig. 1.a.  Investment Growth and Political Stability 
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Fig. 1.b.  Investment Growth and Economic Uncertainty 
 
 
Moving now to the ARDL model, Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips 
Perron (PP) unit root tests are applied to check the stationarity of the variables that enters into 
the model. The results presented in Appendix indicate that GDP growth rate, user-cost of 
capital, and trade openness are stationary at level whereas investment, real credit, economic 
uncertainty and political stability are integrated (process) of order one. Physical infrastructure 
variable has a very strong inertia, therefor it is de-trended before applying the tests. Based on 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) lag lengths of 4,0,3,4,0,2,3 and 0 are selected for 
investment, GDP growth, user cost, financial development, trade openness, physical 
infrastructure, GARCH conditional standard deviation and polity score respectively. 
Since reliability of the estimated model depends on outcomes of diagnostic test, 
firstly discussion on these issues is provided and the results are reported in Appendix. To 
confirm whether residuals follow white noise process and normality assumptions, serial 
correlation LM test for Autocorrelation, ARCH LM test for conditional 
heteroscedasticity, Jarque-Bera (JB) test for normality and Ramsey Reset test for model 
specification are applied. The test results presented in Appendix indicate that there is no 
serious econometric problem in regression residuals and model specification is 
appropriate. Finally, stability of parameters is assessed using CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
tests. The corresponding graphs shown in Appendix indicate that parameter estimates are 
stable. The Adjusted R
2 
is 0.993. Our model is, therefore, explaining 99.3 percent 
variations of the aggregate investment. 
While fitting ARDL model, first of all, presence of long-run relationship is tested 
by “Bounds Test” and F-stat confirms presence of long-run relationship at 2.5 percent 
level of significance. The long-run and short-run relationships can also be confirmed 
through coefficient of error-correction (ECM) term. Table 2 indicates that the estimated 
value of this coefficient is –1.065, which is almost in the middle of the desired range of –
2 to 0 [Rafindadi and Yosuf (2013)]. The estimated value implies that on average 
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investment shock in any year are adjusting within the next year by slight overshooting. 
For example, if investment exceeds (falls short of) the equilibrium level by 100 billion 
rupees in any year then in the very next year investment expenditure will decrease 
(increase) by 106.5 billion rupees. 
The results of the ARDL model are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The findings 
reveal that coefficients of majority of variables are significant in both long-run and short-
run and are consistent with theory. Both the short-run and long-run coefficients of real 
GDP growth variable (G) are positive and highly significant, indicating that economic 
growth is a major factor in stimulating investment. This confirms the validity of 
accelerator principle. The result justifies the argument that conducive economic 
environment enhances investment activity in the economy. Better economic condition 
through increase in income is a signal of optimism and leads to high rates of investment 
[DeLong and Summers (1992); Blomstrom, et al. (1996); Booth (1999); Ghura and 
Goodwin (2000); Krishnaa, et al. (2003)].  
The long run coefficient of user cost of capital (UC) shows negative sign and it is 
statistically significant. The result is consistent with neoclassical investment model which 
theorises that increase in cost of doing business leads to reduction in investment [Hall and 
Jorgensen (1967); Akkina and Celebi (2002)].  In the short-run, the coefficient of UC is 
positive and statistically significant. The neoclassical investment model treats real 
interest rate as an important and significant component of cost of doing business/capital 
and it generally effects investment negatively. However, real interest rate may have 
positive impact on investment in developing countries according to complementarity 
hypothesis of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973).  
It is postulated that a high rate of interest will increase the flow of supply of bank 
credit and by complementing the saving, result in facilitating investment [Luintel and 
Mavrotas (2005)]. This behaviour signifies the role of imperfect capital markets and 
credit constraints prevailing in developing countries. Positive sign supports the 
complementarity hypothesis postulated by neo-liberal approach accentuates the 
conduit/channel effect of saving to investment in the developing countries. According to 
findings, complimentary hypothesis holds in short-run only due to credit constraints, 
whereas in long-run investment is discouraged when the user cost of capital increases. 
 
Table 2 
 Long-run Parameter Estimates 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable is Investment 
SBC Selected Model (4,0,3,4,0,2,3,0) 
Coefficient t-statistics 
G 1.897961 4.11* 
UC –0.0037 –2.63* 
FD 0.4909 38.21* 
OP 0.7345 2.06** 
PI 1.6844 4.61* 
GSD –3.8496 –2.02*** 
POL 0.0098 5.56* 
ND –0.1820 –5.38* 
C –8.4683 –1.15 
Note:  The coefficients significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels are indicated by *, ** and *** 
respectively. 
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Table 3 
 Short-run Parameter Estimates 
Independent Variables 
Short-run Dynamics 
Coefficient T-stats 
ΔI(-1) 0.608 5.79* 
ΔG 2.022 5.08* 
ΔUC 0.001 3.04* 
ΔFD 0.299 3.17* 
ΔOP 0.783 2.32** 
ΔPI –2.164 –1.21 
ΔGSD –3.102 –2.43** 
ΔPOL 0.010 5.01* 
ΔND –0.193 –4.42* 
EC coefficient –1.065 –6.99* 
Note:  The confidents significant at 1 percent and 5 percent levels are indicated by * and ** respectively. 
 
In developing countries due to underdeveloped financial markets, interest rate does 
not reflect the true cost of capital and the availability of financial resources could be a 
more binding constraint rather than user cost. Thus the principal constraint on investment 
could be the quantity, rather than the cost, of financial resources and this justifies the 
inclusion of financial development variable (FD) proxied by domestic credit availability 
in the model [Akkina and Celebi (2002)]. Both the short-run and long-run estimated 
coefficients of financial development (FD) are positive and statistically significant as 
suggested by literature [Akanbi (2016)]. The estimates indicate that improvement of 
financial sector boosts aggregate investment by reducing the financial constraints. This 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that financial intermediaries bridge the financial 
and the real sectors [also see Fry (1998); Agrawal (2000)]. 
Empirical research shows that more open economies attract more capital and 
financial flows than protected economies and provide the justification of including the 
trade openness variable (OP) in the analysis. In our empirical results, trade openness (OP) 
enters with a positive and statistically significant coefficient both in short-run and long-
run. It indicates to possible boost in export-oriented sector which may in turn improve 
current account balance and induce investment [also see Asante (2000); Naa-Idar, et al. 
(2012)]. 
A well-developed physical infrastructure supports investment activities through 
many channels. Firstly it enhances the productivity of capital [Looney (1997)], secondly 
it reduces the transportation and transaction costs and ultimately increases the rate of 
return on investment [Barro (1990); Asiedu (2002)] and finally it provides better access 
to production resources and end good markets [Blejer and Khan (1984); Aschauer (1989); 
Badawi (2003); Suhendra and Anwar (2014)]. In line with empirical research, in the 
long-run contribution of physical infrastructure is positive and significant. But the effect 
of physical infrastructure on investment is negative in the short-run. The obvious reason 
is that advantages that physical infrastructure provides for investment occur in long-run, 
while physical infrastructure development in short run may disrupt transportation 
channels for the time being. 
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Macroeconomic uncertainty renders the adverse effects on investment decisions 
and discourages investment activities. As expected, macroeconomic uncertainty (captured 
through GARCH conditional standard deviation) has significantly negative effects both in 
long-run and short-run. Uncertainty causes sluggishness in investment through creating 
passive expectation about future. It hampers the investment decision by creating 
ambiguity about future cash-flows and expected raised business cost. The impact of 
uncertainty will be more pronounced in the presence of large sunk cost.   
As already mentioned, political stability is captured through polity IV score, where 
higher score represents more democratic environment. The coefficient of political 
stability variable (POL) is positive and statistically significant both in long-run and short-
run, indicating that improvement in political environment leads to higher level of 
investment activities. At first sight, the small magnitude of the estimated slope coefficient 
may indicate that the effect of political uncertainty on investment is not substantial. 
However, since the investment variable is in natural log form, the estimated slope 
coefficient indicates that increase in political stability score by one unit on the scale of –
10 to +10 results in increase in investment by 0.98 percent in long-run and 1 percent in 
short-run. Or equivalently, we can say that five percentage points increase in political 
stability score results in about one percent increase in investment, which does not seem to 
be negligible. 
Conversely, political instability (deterioration of political climate) shatters the 
investors’ confidence and, hence, lowers the level of overall investment in the economy. 
The worsening political situations are associated with inconsistent and frequently 
changing economic policies and make investment climate unfriendly. In such situations, 
firms are much conscious about taxation and regulation policies. In such uncertain 
climate firms adopt wait and see strategy and tend to postpone their investment decisions. 
Government policies in Pakistan shifted drastically during 1970s in the form of 
nationalisation of banking and large-scale manufacturing sectors. To capture the impact 
of this factor, a dummy variable (ND) is included and its coefficient is observed to be 
negative and highly significant. There would be many possible reasons of it. Firstly, shift 
in the government policy created an uncertain environment that shattered the confidence 
of the investors. Secondly it crowded the private investment out and shook the roots of 
the private investment structure. Further, inefficiency arising due to the government’s 
control over banking system erupted financial backbone of the economy and investment 
level declined.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The study has examined the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty calculated 
through real exchange rate volatility and political (in)stability captured by polity IV index 
on the aggregate investment in Pakistan, while controlling for other economic and 
government policy variables. The model, devised in the light of theoretical and empirical 
literature, is estimated by employing the ARDL approach using annual time series data 
from 1960 to 2015. 
The results reveal that both accelerator theory and neoclassical investment model 
explain the aggregate investment behaviour quite significantly that is the output and user 
costs both are important in influencing capital formation/investment. Political stability, 
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government nationalisation policy and macroeconomic uncertainty are found to have 
adversely affected the overall investment in Pakistan. The 1970s nationalisation policy of 
government, especially for banking and manufacturing sectors, had discouraged 
investment activity in Pakistan. The positive indicators of economic performance like 
GDP growth rate, financial development, physical infrastructure and trade openness are 
all found to be important factors in promoting investment activity. High user cost of 
capital is found to be a binding constraint on investment in long-run only but it tends to 
promote investment in short-run by relaxing the credit supply constraint.   
The study concludes that investment activity flourishes under stable political and 
economic conditions while uncertainty on either front is detrimental to investment 
climate. In addition, positive and sustained development in key economic indicators like 
economic growth, infrastructure and financial development and international trade is also 
essential to promote investment activity. 
A number of lessons for investment policy can be drawn from the study. First, in 
order to make investment an economically viable activity in long-run, investment funds 
have to be committed for a sufficiently long duration. For realisation of such commitment 
consistency of economic conditions and political environment is crucial. A stable 
political/democratic environment not only ensures consistency of economic policies in 
long-run, but it also provides a milieu in which economic policies, especially fiscal and 
monetary policies, are guided by political economic considerations rather than pure 
political compulsions. 
Second, even though financial sector of Pakistan has grown both in terms of size 
and efficiency over the past few decades, credit availability is still constrained by 
distortions mainly because of large scale crowding out of funds due to excessive public 
borrowing and loan defaults. These distortions can be eased by granting further autonomy 
to the entire financial sector of the country. Third, nationalisation of businesses has 
adversely affected investment climate in Pakistan. Although banking, telecommunication 
and education sectors and quite a few manufacturing industries have been privatised, 
certain industries like airlines and steel production also need to be privatised on priority 
basis in order to ease the drain on investable funds and to encourage profitable 
investment in these areas as well. Once the loss-making entities are no more a drain on 
government budget, funds would be easily diverted to infrastructure development, which 
is crucial to reduce the cost of doing business.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1 
 Unit Root Tests for Real Exchange Rate 
 Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF)Test 
Phillips Perron  
(PP)Test 
Variables Intercept Intercept and Trend Intercept Intercept and Trend 
RER –1.452 
(0.557) 
–2.240 
(0.465) 
–1.430 
(0.568) 
–2.045  
(0.574) 
ΔRER –13.05*  
(0.000) 
–13.06* 
(0.000) 
–17.44* 
(0.000) 
–17.44*  
(0.000) 
P-values are provided in the brackets. 
The statistics significant at 1 percent are indicated by *. 
 
Table A2 
 ARCH and Serial Correlation Tests for Real Exchange Rate 
                                    ARCH LM TEST 
 ARCH(1) ARCH(2) ARCH(3) 
Obs*R
2
 79.17* 
(0.00) 
89.88* 
(0.00) 
91.16* 
(0.00) 
Ljung-Box Q-Stat 
 Q(8) Q(16) Q(32) 
Q-stat 102.7* 
(0.00) 
126.8* 
(0.00) 
134.4* 
(0.00) 
 
Table A3 
 Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity Tests on the Residuals of  
Selected GARCH Model 
                                         ARCH LM TEST 
 ARCH(1) ARCH(2) ARCH(3) 
Obs*R
2
 3.36 
(0.18) 
3.48 
(0.47) 
3.49 
(0.74) 
                                             Ljung-Box Q-Stat 
 Q(8) Q(16) Q(32) 
Q-stat 3.90 
(0.272) 
18.7 
(0.06) 
38.8 
(0.11) 
P-values are provided in the brackets.  
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Table A4 
Unit Root Tests Results for Variables of ARDL Model 
 Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test Phillips Perron (PP) Test 
Variables  Intercept Intercept and Trend Intercept Intercept and Trend 
I –1.523 
(0.514) 
–3.391*** 
(0.063) 
–1.515 
(0.518) 
–2.824 
(0.195) 
ΔI –5.64* 
(0.000) 
–5.626* 
(0.000) 
–5.472* 
(0.000) 
–5.418* 
(0.000) 
G –5.194* 
(0.000) 
–5.715* 
(0.000) 
–5.207* 
(0.000) 
–5.646* 
(0.000) 
UC –2.88* 
(0.055) 
–3.929** 
(0.018) 
–6.72* 
(0.000) 
–6.801* 
(0.000) 
FD –1.750 
(0.400) 
–2.314 
(0.420) 
–2.776*** 
(0.068) 
–2.659 
(0.257) 
ΔFD –4.854* 
(0.000) 
–4.986* 
(0.000) 
–4.847* 
(0.000) 
–4.996* 
(0.000) 
PI1 –2.269** 
(0.0238) 
 
–1.24 
(0.1947) 
 
ΔPI 
  
–3.794* 
(0.000) 
 
OP –3.354** 
(0.017) 
–3.931** 
(0.017) 
–3.420** 
(0.014) 
–3.923** 
(0.017) 
POL –2.391 
(0.149) 
–2.384 
(0.384) 
–2.661*** 
(0.087) 
–2.666 
(0.254) 
ΔPOL –6.810* 
(0.000) 
–6.746* 
(0.000) 
–6.810* 
(0.000) 
–6.747* 
(0.000) 
GSD –1.013 
(0.741) 
–2.190 
(0.484) 
–9.429* 
(0.000) 
–10.55* 
(0.000) 
ΔGSD –62.57* 
(0.000) 
–62.85* 
(0.000) 
  
P-values are provided in the brackets. The statistics significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent are 
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. In the test equation for PI there is no constant as it is de-trended 
variable. 
 
Table A5 
 Diagnostic Tests of ARDL Model 
Test Statistic P-value 
AR(1) LM Test (1) n*R
2
 = 0.384 0.535 
ARCH (1) LM Test n*R
2
 = 1.106 0.292 
Normality teat JB-statistic =2.39 0.302 
Ramsey RESET Test t-statistic = 0.78 
F-statistic = 0.61 
0.4408 
0.4408 
Number of Observations  55 (1960-2015)  
R
2 
0.996  
Adjusted R
2 
0.993  
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Fig. A1.  CUSUM and CUSUMSQ Tests for Parameters Stability 
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Table A6 
 Results of Bounds Test 
Test Statistic 
Calculated 
Value 
Level of 
Significance 
Lower bound 
Critical Value 
Upper bound 
Critical Value 
F-statistic 3.935 5% 2.32 3.50 
2.5% 2.6 3.84 
1% 2.96 4.26 
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